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FOREWORD
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast 
Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular 
rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn 
greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in 
international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 
towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has 
had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most 
of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes 
domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new 
international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out 
in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious 
analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at 
encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and 
dynamism of this exciting region.
THE EDITORS
Series Chairman:
Tan Chin Tiong
Series Editor:
Ooi Kee Beng
Editorial Committee:
Su-Ann Oh
Daljit Singh
Francis E. Hutchinson
Benjamin Loh
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Harnessing the Potential of  
the Indonesian Diaspora
By Charlotte Setijadi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• In recent years, the Indonesian government has increased efforts to 
harness the economic, political, and social potential of its diaspora.
• A recent high-profile event was the 4th annual Congress of 
Indonesian Diasporas that took place in Jakarta on 1 July 2017. 
Opened by former U.S. President Barack Obama, the event was 
intended to draw the Indonesian public’s attention towards the 
contributions of Indonesian diaspora communities abroad.
• Current estimates put the number of overseas Indonesians at about 
8 million people worldwide. Members of the Indonesian diaspora 
are lobbying for legislative amendments, including dual citizenship, 
parliamentary representation, property ownership rights, and 
constitutional recognition.
• There are plans to set up a separate governmental office for diaspora 
affairs. Presidential Regulation Number 76/2017 also put into law 
the “Diaspora Card” that will provide Indonesians abroad with 
special entitlements such as long-term visas and property ownership 
rights.
• The Indonesian government needs to take the potential of its 
diaspora seriously in order to capitalize on their enormous capital 
and skills contribution.
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11 Charlotte Setijadi is Visiting Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, 
ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
2 “International Migrant Stock 2015” <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/
population/migration/data/estimates2/estimatesgraphs.shtml?4g4> (accessed 
4 August 2017.
Harnessing the Potential of  
the Indonesian Diaspora
By Charlotte Setijadi1
INTRODUCTION
According to data from the United Nations, Indonesia now has the 
fifteenth largest diaspora population in the world.2 With various estimates 
placing the number of overseas Indonesians at up to 8 million people 
worldwide, the Indonesian diaspora has enormous economic, social, and 
political potentials for Indonesia that have largely remained untapped. 
However, in recent times, the Indonesian government has displayed 
greater recognition towards the contribution and specific needs of the 
country’s diaspora.
Indeed, members of Indonesia’s overseas communities have more 
actively organized themselves in the last few years through lobby groups 
such as the Indonesian Diaspora Network (IDN) spearheaded by Dr Dino 
Patti Djalal, former Indonesian Ambassador to the United States and Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY). Overseas community groups like IDN have demanded greater 
recognition of their national belonging from the government, regardless 
of whether they are still Indonesian citizens or not. As well as recognition, 
these expatriates are also lobbying for legislative changes that would 
allow them to maintain both material and emotional attachments in 
17-J02959 01 Trends_2017-18.indd   1 7/11/17   11:37 AM
2Indonesia, such as land ownership, business interests, and the ability to 
vote in elections.
In response, the government has promised to review the dual 
citizenship law, and has in the meantime proposed other diaspora-specific 
initiatives designed to strengthen ties between overseas Indonesians and 
the “homeland”. Indeed, the Indonesian government seems to have begun 
to realize the importance of mobilizing its overseas diaspora to advance 
its national interests. Here, Indonesia has much to learn from countries 
such as China and India that have successfully utilized their diaspora 
networks as economic, cultural, and political mediators in advancing 
their respective state agendas.
In this article, I examine recent issues and developments in Indonesian 
diaspora activism, including the progress of long-standing requests 
such as changes to the dual citizenship law. I then discuss some of the 
ways in which the Indonesian government may harness the potential 
of its diaspora in the future, especially since overseas Indonesians are 
now wealthier, more mobile, and better connected than ever before. 
I argue that the case study of the Indonesian state’s growing relationship 
with its diaspora can enrich our understanding of how Southeast Asian 
countries are cultivating better and more beneficial relationships with 
their diaspora communities.
OBAMA AT THE 4TH ANNUAL CONGRESS 
OF INDONESIAN DIASPORAS
In his first visit to Asia after leaving the U.S. presidential office, former 
President Barack Obama was in Indonesia to open the 4th annual 
Congress of Indonesian Diasporas (CID4) that took place in Jakarta 
on 1 July 2017. Organized by IDN, the congress was attended by up to 
6,000 overseas Indonesians who had come to Jakarta for the occasion. 
The event was also attended by a host of ministers, government officials, 
military officers, foreign dignitaries, and prominent political figures such 
as former President Megawati Soekarnoputri, Foreign Minister Retno 
Marsudi, Finance Minister Sri Mulyani, House Speaker Setya Novanto, 
Jakarta Governor-elect Anies Baswedan, and Police Chief General Tito 
Karnavian.
17-J02959 01 Trends_2017-18.indd   2 7/11/17   11:37 AM
3Local and international media attention surrounding Obama’s 
Indonesia visit — which included a short family holiday in Bali and 
Yogyakarta, and a casual lunch with President Jokowi — successfully 
provided an enormous publicity boost for the diaspora congress. Indeed, 
securing Obama as a guest of honour was an impressive feat on the 
part of the congress organizers, especially considering the fact that the 
Indonesian “diaspora” is a relatively new concept in Indonesian political 
discourse, and there have so far only been four congresses of Indonesian 
diaspora.
While organized by the IDN as a private organization and with 
privately sourced corporate sponsors such as local media conglomerate 
Emtek Group and smartphone company Blackberry, this year’s congress 
had full government support through relevant ministries such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The scale and prestige of this year’s diaspora 
convention shows increased effort by the Indonesian government to 
harness the economic, social, and political potentials of the 8 million 
Indonesians living abroad.
THE APPEAL TO RETURN “HOME”
In his keynote speech, Obama spoke more broadly about pluralism, 
economic inequality, gender equality, and the global need to combat 
radicalism and terrorism. His message about pluralism and tolerance 
was popular with the local media, particularly in the wake of the recent 
Jakarta gubernatorial election that saw a spike in religious and ethnic 
tensions in the capital and roused fears that Indonesia will become an 
ever more conservative society in the future.3
However, in keeping with the congress’ theme of “Creating Synergy 
to Build Our Nation,”4 Obama also emphasized the importance of 
3 “Indonesia can inspire other Muslim countries in promoting tolerance: Obama” 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/07/01/indonesia-can-inspire-other-
muslim-countries-in-promoting-tolerance-obama.html> (accessed 18 July 2017).
4 The IDN Congress was held in English and not in Indonesian. Most of the 
publication and marketing materials associated with the conference were also 
printed in English. According to the organizers, this was to make the congress
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4maintaining one’s roots, and of cultivating human capital in the nation-
building process. In his speech, a nostalgic Obama spoke of fond 
memories of living in Indonesia for four years during his childhood 
when his mother Ann Dunham was married to his Indonesian stepfather 
Lolo Soetoro. The adoring crowd cheered each time Obama mentioned 
the Indonesian names of foods he claimed to miss, such as sate (satay) 
and bakso (meatball soup). Nevertheless, amidst the food nostalgia 
and humour, having Obama there as a speaker served a more symbolic 
example for the overseas Indonesians present at the congress: here was 
a widely popular former U.S. President who never forgot his Indonesian 
links, and who has now “returned” to Indonesia.
Indeed, throughout the congress, the notion of “returning” (pulang) 
home to Indonesia was a prominent message, not just from Obama, 
but also from other high-profile speakers, such as Finance Minister Sri 
Mulyani and Vice Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Arcandra 
Tahar, both of whom are “returned” overseas Indonesians. This message 
was perhaps made most explicitly by Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, 
who in her opening speech, read a poem she had personally written, 
entitled Anakku (My Child). The poem tells of a mother’s advice for her 
adult child to never lose a sense of duty (bakti) towards Indonesia, no 
matter how successful they have become or how far they have travelled.
The congress’ direct appeal for Indonesians abroad to either return 
home or contribute to Indonesia’s national development through financial 
or other means is in line with the message that the government has been 
projecting in recent times.
For instance, during his speech to a large gathering of Indonesians 
living in the Australian city of Sydney on 26 February 2017, President 
materials more universal and easier to understand for many diaspora attendees 
who speak many different languages (some of whom no longer speak Indonesian 
well). However, the organizers’ decision to use English in promotional materials 
can also be seen as an appeal to the cosmopolitan sensibilities of Indonesian 
diasporic subjects, as well as to publicly display the transnational upward 
mobility and social capital possessed by the diaspora, as exemplified by the use 
of English (along with Indonesian) within the community.
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5Jokowi encouraged those present to help with the development of 
Indonesia’s material and social infrastructures. In his speech, Jokowi 
implores: “Those who are studying here [in Australia], return to the 
motherland [Indonesia] immediately [after your studies]. Those who 
are already working here, please open businesses in the motherland. 
The country needs human capital with intelligence, skills, high integrity, 
and high productivity, because that is how our country will be able to 
compete with other countries.”5
That was not the first time that Jokowi had asked overseas Indonesians 
to return home. He made a similar speech during a meet-and-greet 
session with Indonesians living in Washington, D.C. during his U.S. 
visit in October 2015, then even promising that his government would 
look into pushing through a law that would allow for dual citizenship.6 
On another occasion, Jokowi said that he had personally asked twenty-
four Indonesian professors currently working in U.S. universities 
to come home and improve Indonesian universities, particularly in 
under-developed regions such as Papua.7 In the past, former President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and various government ministers and 
ambassadors also made similar appeals, but Jokowi’s government has 
amplified the rhetoric.8
5 “Jokowi Minta WNI di Australia Pulang Untuk Bangun Tanah Air” [Jokowi 
Asks Indonesian Citizens in Australia to Come Home to Help With Nation 
Building] <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3432255/jokowi-minta-wni-di-
australia-pulang-untuk-bangun-tanah-air> (accessed 19 July 2017). Translated 
from Indonesian by the author.
6 “Jokowi Janji Dorong RUU Dwikewarganegaraan” [Jokowi Promises 
to Push Review of Citizenship Law] <http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2015/10/26/15413891/Jokowi.Janji.Dorong.RUU.Dwikenegaraan> 
(accessed 19 July 2017).
7 “Jokowi Ajak 24 Profesor Indonesia di AS Untuk Bangun Papua” [Jokowi Asks 
24 Indonesian Professors in the US to Build Papua] <http://nasional.kompas.
com/read/2016/08/18/14014311/jokowi.ajak.24.profesor.indonesia.di.as.untuk.
bangun.papua> (accessed 2 August 2017).
8 “SBY Invites Diaspora Investment” <http://m.thejakartaglobe.com/news/sby-
invites-diaspora-investment/> (accessed 19 July 2017).
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6Now as Jokowi’s government strives to bring more foreign investments 
into Indonesia, the country may need the contribution of its overseas 
population more than ever. The government would also like to increase 
the Indonesian diaspora’s remittance potential. While remittances are 
already an important source of income for many poor rural areas, it 
currently only contributes 1 per cent to the country’s GDP, which is small 
compared for instance to the Philippines where remittances make up over 
10 per cent of the annual GDP.9 This is not to mention the diaspora’s 
political potential, especially considering that there are currently over 
2 million registered overseas Indonesian voters.
WHAT IS THE INDONESIAN DIASPORA?
In the past, the image of Indonesians living abroad was commonly 
associated with the many (mostly female) low-skilled domestic and 
migrant workers working in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Saudi Arabia. There is, of course, a long history of Indonesians 
going abroad for study or high-skilled work, but these types of overseas 
experiences were mainly confined to the rich who could afford to seek 
transnational education and opportunities, or a small pool of talented 
young people who went abroad to pursue higher education in more 
developed countries, often on bonded government scholarships. Because 
this image of Indonesians abroad is quite marginal to Indonesian society 
as a whole, their existence and national contributions have been largely 
unknown/unacknowledged, and the public does not hear much about 
them apart from the occasional cases about Indonesian domestic workers 
(Tenaga Kerja Indonesia or TKI) being abused by their employers.
However, in the last few decades, Indonesia has witnessed considerable 
changes in terms of the demographic characteristics and socio-political 
outlooks of its citizens. The rise of Indonesia’s affluent middle class since 
the 1980s means that, today, this segment of the country’s population 
— estimated at 74 million in 2014 and expected to double to roughly 
9 “World Bank Data on Personal Remittance” <http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS> (accessed 21 July 2017).
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7141 million by 202010 — is more educated, possesses more optimistic 
outlooks about their economic futures, and thus has more ambitious 
aspirations for upward mobility. Increasing global interconnectivity also 
means that contemporary Indonesians are much more transnationally 
connected, and more and more Indonesians go abroad for study, work, 
marriage, and other opportunities.
Today, the top receiving countries for overseas Indonesians include 
Malaysia, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong. More affluent Indonesians also migrate as professional or investor 
migrants to wealthy Western countries such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Australia.
There are various estimates on the number of Indonesian citizens, 
former citizens, and those of Indonesian descent living overseas. 
However, the first problem of identification from a statistical point of 
view lies in defining who should be considered members of “diaspora”, 
to begin with.
Traditionally, “diaspora” was used to refer more specifically to Jews 
who had to flee or were taken away from their homes in ancient Judea.11 
Because of this, the term previously implied an involuntary dispersal 
whereby refugees maintain emotional ties and a nostalgic longing for 
an eventual return to the homeland. Today however, the term diaspora is 
used not to only refer to Jews, but also to the overseas populations of other 
nations. So broad is the application of the term nowadays that sociologist 
Rogers Brubaker notes that diaspora now refers “to an ever-broadening 
set of cases: essentially to any and every nameable population category 
that is to some extent dispersed in space.”12
10 “Indonesia’s Rising Middle-Class and Affluent Consumers: Asia’s Next 
Big Opportunity” <https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/center_
consumer_customer_insight_consumer_products_indonesias_rising_middle_
class_affluent_consumers/> (accessed 23 July 2016).
11 M. Rozen, Homelands and Diasporas: Greeks, Jews and Their Migrations 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2008).
12 R. Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no . 1 
(2005), p. 3.
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8However, while scholars like Brubaker agree that contemporary 
definitions and uses of the term “diaspora” have become much broader, 
there are still some characteristics that define the many diverse diaspora 
communities worldwide. For instance, William Safran famously 
proposed six characteristics of the modern diaspora, namely: (i) a sense of 
having dispersed from an original “centre” to two or more “peripheries” 
or foreign regions; (ii) the retention of a collective memory, vision, or 
myth about the original homeland; (iii) a feeling of alienation that stems 
from the belief that they cannot (at least fully) be accepted by their new 
homelands; (iv) a longing for the ancestral homeland as the “true” home; 
(v) a sense of commitment to maintain the safety and prosperity of the 
ancestral homeland; and (vi) feelings of ethno-communal consciousness 
and solidarity with other diaspora members who also continue to 
personally or vicariously relate to the homeland.13 Although not all of 
these characteristics apply to all diaspora communities or members 
within them, generally, diaspora subjects are understood to possess a 
sense of multiple simultaneous belongings to the “homeland,” the host 
countries, and to a globally dispersed community of fellow expatriates.
While the term “diaspora” is new in Indonesia, the concepts of 
sojourning and of migratory mobility are not. Different tribes (suku) 
and ethnic groups in the Indonesian archipelago have had long histories 
of sojourning across lands and oceans that stretch back well before the 
period of Dutch colonization. For instance, seafarers and explorers from 
the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires were recorded to have sojourned 
all over the Indian Ocean, mainland Southeast Asia, and even beyond. 
The Minangkabau people of west Sumatra place such an emphasis on 
the act of sojourning (merantau), that of leaving one’s home — either 
temporarily or permanently — in order to gain experience and to seek 
one’s fortune is considered an important rite of passage for young males. 
The spread of Bugis communities throughout maritime Southeast Asia is 
13 W. Safran, “Diaspora in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return”, 
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 1, no. 1 (1991): 83-84.
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9also so extensive and influential that much of the scholarly literature on 
the Bugis has focused on their many “diaspora” communities.14
Another conceptual complexity with the use of the term “diaspora” 
in the Indonesian context is that the term is traditionally used to refer 
to the dispersion of people from the same ethnic/ethno-linguistic group 
who are bound together by a sense of common ancestry, culture, and 
traditional homeland, as in the case of the Jewish diaspora. Indonesia, 
on the other hand, is a modern nation-state comprised of many ethnic 
and linguistic groups from different local homelands. So, the Indonesian 
diaspora can therefore be understood as a global community bound 
together not by common ancestry or ethnicity, but by a broader sense of 
common national homeland and modern nationhood. This new definition 
of diaspora has become more commonplace in recent times, particularly 
as postcolonial national identities mature and new generations of nation-
state subjects migrate abroad and form diaspora communities based on 
their common national identity.15 For instance it is now common to refer 
to a Singaporean, Malaysian, or Australian diaspora.
Organizations such as the IDN have been influential in popularizing 
the term “Indonesian diaspora” in public discourse. According to former 
Indonesian Ambassador to the United States and founder of the IDN, 
Dr Dino Patti Djalal, the foreign term “diaspora” was chosen instead 
of local terms such as the Malay “rantau” because the term is more 
internationally recognized, and also because it signifies a dispersed 
14 L. Andaya, “The Bugis-Makassar Diasporas”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society 68, no. 1 (1995): 119–38.
15 See, for instance, new studies of modern national diaspora communities, 
such as J.B. Park, Identity, Policy, and Prosperity: Border Nationality of the 
Korean Diaspora and Regional Development in Northeast China (Singapore: 
Springer Nature, 2017). See also F. Adamson and M. Demetriou, “Remapping 
the Boundaries of ‘State’ and ‘National Identity’: Incorporating Diasporas into 
IR Theorizing”, European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (2007): 
489–526.
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population with strong transnational connections.16 Dr Djalal added that 
the Indonesian diaspora includes not only those who are still Indonesian 
citizens, but also naturalized citizens of other countries, and the children/
descendants of Indonesians who are now living abroad. Because of this 
very open definition, anyone with Indonesian ancestry — regardless 
of whether or not they have lived in Indonesia — can technically be 
regarded as members of the Indonesian diaspora. This very inclusive 
definition makes it difficult to determine how many members of the 
Indonesian diaspora there are, globally.
The United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UN DESA) places the global number of Indonesians living abroad at 
3.8 million in 2015. As seen in Figure 1, according to this organization, 
the number of Indonesians abroad in 2015 has increased by more than 
230 per cent since 1990. UN DESA bases their calculations on data 
obtained from the national surveys of countries from around the world, 
and these surveys rely on respondents to self-identity their ethnic/national 
affiliations.
Most other estimates range from 2 to 8 million overseas Indonesians, 
and the large discrepancy can be attributed to differences in methodology. 
For instance, Dr Djalal claimed that data of registered Indonesians from 
167 Indonesian consular offices around the world stand at 4.7 million 
in 2013.17 This estimate was later further raised to reach the 8 million 
figure often quoted by the IDN and Indonesian government officials.18 
On the other hand, the Global Migrant Origin Database, developed by 
the Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty at the 
16 Interview conducted in Jakarta on 4 July 2017.
17 “Diaspora Indonesia: Konektivitas Menjadi Jiwa Nasionalisme” [Indonesian 
Diaspora: From Connectivity to Nationalist Spirit] <http://idn.kbrikualalumpur.
org/index.php/80-template-details/general/111-idn> (accessed 27 July 2017).
18 “Dino Patti Djalal: 8 Juta Diaspora Aset Besar Untuk RI” [Dino Patti Djalal: 
8 Million Diaspora a Big Asset for the Republic of Indonesia] <http://global.
liputan6.com/read/3007853/dino-patti-djalal-8-juta-diaspora-aset-besar-untuk-
ri> (accessed 31 July 2017).
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Figure 1: Indonesians living abroad, 1990–2015
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Department.
University of Sussex made a more modest estimate of just over 1.8 million 
overseas Indonesians in 2007.19 As Salut Muhidin and Ariane Utomo20 
point out, more conservative estimates of the Indonesian diaspora are 
mainly drawn from international migrant stock datasets that, like the UN 
DESA data, are mostly based on statistics of foreign-born populations 
obtained from national population censuses. They tend to exclude second 
and later generations, as well as other overseas Indonesians who were 
not born in Indonesia. Despite the different methodologies however, one 
thing common to all these datasets is that the number of Indonesians 
abroad is increasing every year.
19 “Global Migrant Origin Database: Indonesia” <http://www.migrationdrc.org/
research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html> (accessed 
28 July 2017).
20 S. Muhidin and A. Utomo, “How many overseas Indonesians are there?”, 
Discussion Paper Series, no. 1 (Sydney: Indonesia Diaspora Network, 2013).
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Indonesian diaspora communities are also extremely diverse in terms 
of demographic profiles. While it is true that there are now more upwardly 
mobile middle and upper class Indonesians living abroad who possess 
large financial capital, it needs to be remembered that the majority of 
Indonesia’s overseas workforce are still migrant workers who mostly 
work as domestic helpers or low-skilled labourers. Estimates from the 
Indonesian Ministry of Manpower places the total number of Indonesian 
migrant workers abroad at up to 6 million worldwide.21 These types of 
workers possess limited financial and social capital,22 have restricted 
mobility because of their visa statuses, and in the past have been afforded 
very little protection from workplace abuses, either from the Indonesian 
government or the host countries.23
HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF 
INDONESIANS ABROAD
Despite differences in definitions, statistical data, and demographic 
profiles, the millions of Indonesians abroad are a valuable asset for 
Indonesia’s national development that have so far remained largely 
untapped.
21 “Jumlah Pekerja Asing di RI Masih Sedikit Ketimbang TKI” [Number of 
Foreign Expatriates in Indonesia Still Smaller than Indonesian Migrant Workers 
Abroad] <http://bisnis.liputan6.com/read/2692942/jumlah-pekerja-asing-di-ri-
masih-sedikit-ketimbang-tki> (accessed 31 July 2017).
22 While migrant workers have limited social capital in their “host” countries, 
many come “home’ with much increased social capital having accumulated 
relatively greater wealth and cosmopolitan prestige abroad. Returned Bugis 
migrants from Malaysia, for example, will reappear in their villages, and use 
significant accumulated funds to build new, grander, houses, and will — in the 
eyes of their non-migrant counterparts — have achieved a kind of cultural capital 
having worked overseas. Maids who return from Saudi Arabia to places like Java 
also return with significant cultural, religious, not to mention linguistic capital 
— having become fluent in Arabic and performed the haj during their stay there.
23 See W. Palmer, Indonesia’s Overseas Labour Migration Programme, 1969–
2010 (Leiden: Brill, 2016). See also M.M. Rahman and Lian K.F., “Gender and 
the remittance process: Indonesian domestic workers in Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Malaysia”, Asian Population Studies 5, no. 2 (2009): 103–25.
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Economy
Economically, Indonesia has much to gain from its diaspora. In terms 
of remittances alone, according to the World Bank Group’s Global 
Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development Initiative, in 2015, 
Indonesia was the fourteenth largest recipient of migrant remittances in 
the world, with an estimated US$10.5 billion sent into the country by 
overseas Indonesians annually.24 Yet as mentioned before, this financial 
inflow currently only amounts to around 1 per cent of Indonesia’s annual 
GDP, and there is much room for improvement, particularly among 
overseas Indonesians who are not currently remittance senders. The 
Indonesian government is also keen for its diaspora to play a more active 
role as brokers in trade dealings between Indonesia and other countries. 
To this end, Jokowi has been asking the Indonesian diaspora to act as 
economic go-betweens in trade deals between Indonesia and whatever 
“host” country they now live in.25
Dr Djalal explains` that philanthropy is another area in which the 
Indonesian diaspora can contribute in more concrete financial terms. 
The combined wealth of Indonesians abroad is currently unknown, 
but contributions for charitable causes such as the building of schools, 
hospitals, orphanages, religious facilities, and other projects in rural 
areas would help with the country’s national development. According 
to Dr Djalal, Indonesian communities across the world can also utilize 
their personal and group networks to promote and distribute Indonesian 
products abroad.26
Unlike other countries with large diaspora communities, Indonesia 
has never properly utilized its overseas community for people-to-people 
24 “Indonesia Ranks 14th Among Remittance Recipients: World Bank” <http://
jakartaglobe.id/economy/indonesia-ranks-14th-among-remittance-recipients-
world-bank/> (accessed 20 July 2017).
25 “Jokowi Wants Indonesian Diaspora to Help with Exports” <https://en.tempo.
co/read/news/2017/07/03/056888442/Jokowi-Wants-Indonesian-Diaspora-to-
Help-with-Exports> (accessed 21 July 2017).
26 Interview conducted in Jakarta on 4 July 2017.
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(P2P) or business-to-business (B2B) diplomacy. Unlike China and India, 
there is currently no special government branch to liaise with the millions 
of diaspora subjects living abroad, and there are presently only two 
dedicated officers for diaspora matters within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Dr Djalal argues that current efforts are not nearly enough, and, 
particularly now that Jokowi’s administration wants to promote foreign 
investment and tourism, the government should make a more concerted 
effort to unify Indonesians abroad in order to create a sense of belonging 
and duty to the homeland.27
Even with the relatively low level of government support given 
now, members of the Indonesian diaspora have been actively organizing 
themselves and getting involved in activities that strengthen their sense 
of “Indonesianness”. There are many Indonesian associations abroad 
catering to students, families, and religious communities, and there are 
even Indonesian language/cultural centres and schools in large population 
areas like Singapore and Malaysia. While some of these organizations 
were the initiatives of Indonesian embassies and consulates, many were 
started by the communities themselves and funded through community 
donations and membership fees.
Politics and Parliamentary Representation
Politically, the Indonesian diaspora has been quite active, particularly 
during presidential elections. The Indonesian Electoral Commission 
registered over 2 million overseas voters for the 2014 legislative and 
presidential elections.28 While overseas voters only amount to around 
1 per cent of Indonesia’s over 186 million registered voters, these 
2 million votes are still important, particularly in tight elections. 
Currently, Indonesian overseas voters are lumped together as part of the 
27 Ibid.
28 “Jumlah Pemilih Luar Negeri Bertambah 14.000” [Number of Overseas Voters 
Increased by 14,000] <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/01/13/1824358/
Jumlah.Pemilih.Luar.Negeri.Bertambah.14.000> (accessed 1 August 2017).
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DKI (Jakarta Special Administrative Region) second electoral district 
that covers the affluent Central and South Jakarta regions.
In the 2014 legislative election, PDI-P won the most number of seats 
in the electoral district. In the presidential election later the same year, 
Jokowi and running mate Jusuf Kalla (JK) won 53.74 per cent of the 
votes in overseas polling booths following enthusiastic social media 
campaigning and record voter turnout among diaspora communities.29
Interestingly, there was a clear divide among overseas Indonesians 
who voted for Jokowi-JK, and those who voted for Prabowo-Hatta in 
the 2014 presidential election. Jokowi-JK who were seen as the more 
secular and liberal pair won in the vast majority of overseas polls apart 
from those located in Islamic countries, and they especially suffered 
losses in places where many Indonesian students were enrolled in 
conservative/radical Islamic educational institutions. Prabowo-Hatta 
won in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Qatar, Libya, United Arab 
Emirates (Abu Dhabi, not Dubai where the majority of expatriates are 
white collar professionals), Pakistan, and Egypt.30 The difference in the 
voting behaviour of Indonesians in these countries reflect the different 
demographic profiles of Indonesians abroad, and — while complexities 
and exceptions exist — there has been a clear tendency for more affluent 
middle- and upper-class voters in Western countries to vote for more 
secular, progressive candidates like Jokowi.
The political activism of these more progressive overseas voters has 
also captured the Indonesian public’s attention in recent times, most 
noticeably during former Jakarta Governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja 
Purnama’s failed second term bid earlier this year. Diaspora communities 
29 “Antusiasme Pemilih Luar Negeri Menambah Semangat Jokowi-JK” [The 
Enthusiasm of Overseas Voters Fuels Jokowi-JK’s Energy] <http://www.
beritasatu.com/nasional/195121-antusiasme-pemilih-luar-negeri-menambah-
semangat-jokowijk.html> (accessed 1 August 2017).
30 “Ini Hasil Rekapitulasi Pilpres di TPS Luar Negeri” [Presidential 
Election Result from Overseas Polling Stations] <https://m.tempo.co/read/
news/2014/07/20/269594424/ini-hasil-rekapitulasi-pilpres-di-tps-luar-negeri> 
(accessed 1 August 2017).
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across the world organized campaign events and social media flash-
mobs to support Ahok-Djarot despite the fact that the vast majority 
were ineligible to vote in the Jakarta gubernatorial elections. Many of 
those eligible to vote in Jakarta made a point of flying home just to vote 
for Ahok in both rounds of the election. Indonesian communities in 
Australia, Europe and the United States were very active in social media 
campaigns and in voicing their support for Ahok, with many participating 
in candlelight vigils in cities across the world when he was subsequently 
sent to jail for blasphemy.31
Clearly, these more secular, liberal overseas voters are important 
for Jokowi’s secular coalition in the lead up to the 2019 elections, 
particularly amidst the growing influence of hard-line Islamist factions 
among conservative Muslim voters.
Considering the active overseas Indonesian political scene, it should 
come as no surprise that one of the items that the IDN is lobbying for 
is for the Indonesian diaspora to have its own member of parliament 
(MP) representing a separate overseas electoral district in the national 
parliament (DPR). During a meeting with the Special Taskforce on 
Electoral Legislation Reform (Pansus RUU Pemilu) in June 2017, IDN 
members complained that they did not feel that members of parliament 
representing overseas voters in the DKI second electoral district have 
properly looked after the concerns of Indonesians abroad. They argued 
that issues faced by overseas voters are very different from those faced 
by local Jakarta voters, and — at 2 million people — the population of 
overseas voters is larger than some Indonesian electoral districts.
In response, Chairman of the Pansus Lukman Edy said that the 
government would continue to consider the request, especially as 
the government has agreed to fifteen extra parliamentary seats in the 
upcoming 2019 legislative election. However, Mr Edy said that, since the 
priority is for additional parliamentary seats in domestic constituencies, 
the more likely solution is not for overseas voters to have their own 
31 “Indonesian Diaspora Rallies Around Jailed Jakarta Governor Ahok” <https://
asiancorrespondent.com/2017/05/indonesian-diaspora-rallies-around-jailed-
jakarta-governor-ahok/#abEolxrHC32BXEiA.97> (accessed 20 July 2017).
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separate electoral district, but to have an additional MP representing the 
DKI second district that is more dedicated to overseas voters’ issues.32 
He adds that there is even the possibility that members of the Indonesian 
diaspora can run as MP for the DKI second district in the future.
THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP PROBLEM
Another more urgent and long-standing issue for the Indonesian diaspora 
is dual citizenship. Indonesia does not currently allow for dual citizenship, 
and one must be an Indonesian citizen in order to (among other things) 
vote, have businesses in the country, own property in Indonesia, and 
receive one’s family inheritance. Because of this, many Indonesians 
abroad have refrained from obtaining citizenship in their countries of 
residence (thus limiting their rights as citizens there), and those who 
have become naturalized citizens of other countries harbour hopes that 
they could one day reapply to become Indonesian citizens as soon as the 
country recognizes dual citizenship. As Dr Djalal explains,
Indonesians abroad are patriotic, and most want to remain as 
Indonesian citizens… But at the moment the citizenship law 
requires them to choose [which citizenship they want], and for 
many this is a very emotional decision because they have [a sense 
of] belonging and attachments both in Indonesia and in their new 
countries” 33
Jokowi himself has in the past promised to fast-track the review of 
the dual citizenship issue, particularly for children of Indonesians 
with foreign spouses. At present, Law Number 12/2016 that governs 
citizenship allows for the children of Indonesian nationals married to 
foreign nationals to remain as a dual citizen until the age of 18, upon 
32 “Menimbang Urgensi Pembentukan Dapil Luar Negeri” [Weighing Up the 
Urgency of Forming a Separate Overseas Electoral District] <http://nasional.
kompas.com/read/2017/06/03/04350041/menimbang.urgensi.pembentukan.
dapil.luar.negeri.?page=all> (accessed 31 July 2017).
33 Interview conducted in Jakarta on 4 July 2017.
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which they have to choose whether to remain an Indonesian citizen or 
to relinquish that privilege. These dual-national children also need to be 
registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the record of their 
former dual-national status remains throughout their lives, even if they 
choose Indonesian citizenship. This in turn makes them vulnerable to 
potential discrimination since dual citizenship is still a contentious issue 
in Indonesia.
A case in point was the discrimination faced by Gloria Natapradja 
Hamel, a then 16 year-old high school student who — after a long 
audition process — was selected to be one of the flag raisers for the 
17 August Independence Day ceremony at the National Palace in 2016. 
Miss Hamel’s name was removed from the prestigious team only days 
before she was due to perform when it became known that she was still 
a dual Indonesian-France citizen, by virtue of her father being French.34 
Her case sparked renewed debate about dual citizenship, and Hamel was 
only allowed back in the flag-raising team after direct intervention from 
president Jokowi.
An even bigger national controversy regarding dual-citizenship 
involved current Vice Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources 
Arcandra Tahar. Before his eventual appointment as Vice Minister, 
Jokowi had personally appointed Dr Tahar to become Minister for Energy 
and Mineral Resources in the cabinet reshuffle of July 2016. Dr Tahar 
returned home to Indonesia to take up the post after having lived and 
worked in the United States as an offshore engineering specialist since the 
mid-1990s. However, Jokowi was forced to honourably dismiss Dr Tahar 
from his post as minister only a month later in August 2016 when it was 
discovered that he still held dual Indonesian-U.S. citizenships.35 Amidst 
34 “Polemik Dwi Kewarganegaraan dan Janji Presiden” [The Problem of Dual 
Citizenship and the President’s Promise] <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/
polemik-dwi-kewarganegaraan-dan-janji-jokowi/3555756.html> (accessed 
2 August 2017).
35 “Tersandung Status Dwi Kewarganegaraan, Presiden Copot Menteri ESDM” 
[Tripped by Dual National Status, President Dismissed Energy Minister] <https://
www.voaindonesia.com/a/tersandung-status-dwi-kewarganegaraan-presiden-
copot-menteri-esdm/3465198.html> (accessed 2 August 2017).
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controversy, Dr Tahar relinquished his U.S. citizenship and was fast-
tracked to receive sole Indonesian citizenship after being briefly stateless 
when his Indonesian citizenship was cancelled as a consequence of his 
dual-nationality status, as dictated by the Citizenship Law. Jokowi was 
only able to install him as Vice Minister in October 2016 after he became 
an Indonesian citizen again.
These recent dual citizenship controversies highlight the fact that there 
are still many negative connotations associated with Indonesians who 
choose to have other nationalities. One perception is that Indonesians who 
become citizens of other countries are unpatriotic and disloyal. Taking 
a more pragmatic stance on the issue, Jokowi himself seemed annoyed 
at what he called “noises” (“gaduh”) over dual citizenship, stating that, 
rather than problematizing citizenship matters, Indonesia should be 
rewarding and encouraging its talented, high-achieving citizens so that 
they stay in the country and not go abroad.36
However, negative perceptions of disloyalty are prevalent among 
senior politicians, even those from Jokowi’s own party PDI-P. For 
instance, speaking about the Arcandra Tahar case, PDI-P MP Effendi 
Simbolon said:
there is no need for us to accommodate [dual citizenship]. His 
[Tahar’s] oath of allegiance to the US involved him relinquishing 
allegiance to his country of origin, which means that he has 
betrayed Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. How could we then 
accommodate him just because he’s talented?37
36 “Jokowi: Kita Harusnya Hargai Orang Berprestasi, Bukan Gaduh Terus” 
[Jokowi: We Should Be Appreciating High Achievers, Not Be Perpetually 
“Noisy”] <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/08/18/13292581/jokowi.kita.
harusnya.hargai.orang.berprestasi.bukan.gaduh.terus> (accessed 2 August 2017).
37 “Problematika di Balik Kewarganegaraan Ganda” [The Problems of Dual 
Nationality] <http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/08/160817_
indonesia_kewarganegaraan_ganda> (accessed 2 August 2017). Quote translated 
from Indonesian.
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There are also legal, economic, and security concerns regarding dual 
citizenship. For one, there are worries that people will take advantage 
of dual citizenship to avoid paying taxes in Indonesia. There are also 
concerns that foreign nationals will assume Indonesian citizenship for 
the sole purpose of opening businesses or buying property in Indonesia, 
thus driving up prices for ordinary Indonesians. From a national security 
perspective, there are lingering suspicions that dual nationals will act in 
the political interest of other countries. Indeed, this widespread belief 
is reflected in some of the rumours and hoax news circulated on social 
media which accuse Jokowi of being pro-dual citizenship because he 
wants to allow millions of mainland Chinese to settle in Indonesia.38
To be sure, Indonesia is not alone in its suspicious attitude towards 
those with dual nationality. There are many countries in the world that are 
strictly against dual citizenship, including all Southeast Asian countries 
apart from the Philippines. However, controversies surrounding the dual 
citizenship issue reflect underlying local beliefs about national belonging, 
loyalty, and duty in Indonesia. As a country with a long history of deep 
distrust towards foreign influences, the idea of dual national allegiances 
still does not sit well with many Indonesians. Indeed, despite Jokowi’s 
promises to review the Citizenship Law, the DPR is certainly not in any 
rush to make any changes to accommodate dual citizenship.
At a special information session on dual citizenship during the 4th 
IDN Congress, Golkar MP Meutya Hafid, who is also Deputy Chairperson 
of the House Committee on Defence, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs and 
Communications admitted that a revision of the Citizenship Law is not 
a priority for the DPR, and that, realistically, the issue is not likely to 
be discussed before the 2024 legislative election.39 Ms Hafid said that, 
38 “Staf Kepresidenan Sebut 3 Isu Hoax yang Sering Menyerang Jokowi” 
[Presidential Staff Mentions 3 Hoax Issues Often Used to Attack Jokowi] 
<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/901522/staf-kepresidenan-sebut-3-isu-hoax-
yang-sering-menyerang-jokowi> (accessed 28 October 2017).
39 Recorded during information session on “Dual Citizenship”, 4th IDN Congress, 
Jakarta, 1 July 2017.
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while the issue of dual citizenship is an important one for members of 
the diaspora, there are many domestic and infrastructural issues that must 
be resolved first before the government could even begin to consider 
dual nationality. For instance, the government currently struggles to 
establish even a basic centralized national database of citizen records, 
let alone complicating matters with issues such as dual citizenship. 
Ms Hafid added that there is also currently no consensus within Jokowi’s 
government about dual citizenship, and the DPR cannot proceed with 
reform discussions until the government has made up its mind about the 
matter.
ACCOMMODATING THE INDONESIAN 
DIASPORA
For the time being, the Indonesian diaspora must be content with other 
concessions that the government is willing to make. During the 4th IDN 
Congress, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said that Indonesia must learn 
from countries like China and India in embracing and partnering with its 
diaspora.40 Minister Marsudi admitted that the dual citizenship law will 
be a long deliberation process, and so in the meantime, her ministry plans 
to provide verified members of the diaspora with a special identification 
card that will give them special privileges in entering Indonesia and 
conducting business in the country.
Kartu Masyarakat Indonesian di Luar Negeri (Card for Overseas 
Indonesian Communities, popularly known as Kartu Diaspora or 
Diaspora Card) is one of these initiatives. Officially launched and 
made into law on 4 August 2017 under Presidential Regulation Number 
76/2017 on “Facilities for Indonesian Communities Abroad”, the Diaspora 
Card will be given out to overseas Indonesians who voluntarily register 
themselves with the foreign ministry either in Jakarta or through their 
local embassies. These cards will be made available for both Indonesians 
40 Recorded during keynote speech by Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, 4th IDN 
Congress, Jakarta, 1 July 2017.
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who are still citizens, and those who have become naturalized citizens 
of other countries. Descendants of Indonesians born abroad will also be 
eligible.
The Diaspora Card will enable Indonesians abroad to apply for 
long-term, multiple-visit visas (up to five years per application), as 
well as fast-tracked immigration processing during entry and exit from 
Indonesia at airports and ports.41 Government Regulation Number 
26/2016 already enables former Indonesian nationals living abroad to 
apply for multiple-entry five-year visas, so the Diaspora Card is meant to 
help ease applications for these visas. In the long run, there are plans that 
the Diaspora Card will function in similar fashion to India’s Overseas 
Citizenship of India (OCI) card given to members of the Indian diaspora, 
allowing them to apply for a multiple-entry lifetime visa into India.
Furthermore, Presidential Regulation Number 76/2017 dictates that 
the Diaspora Card provide diaspora members who are still Indonesian 
citizens with the ability to open Indonesian bank accounts, own property, 
and take part in business ventures.42 At this time, details are still unclear 
about what special privileges will be bestowed on diaspora members who 
are now citizens of foreign countries. Considering the proviso within 
the Presidential Regulation stating that benefits to diaspora Indonesians 
are to be administered by the relevant ministries and government 
institutions, the full implementation of the Diaspora Card may face 
greater bureaucratic and legislative obstacles. However, the ultimate goal 
is for non-citizen members of the Indonesian diaspora to one day also be 
able to have access to property ownership rights and ease of business, 
particularly in making investments in Indonesia.
From an administrative point of view, the Diaspora Card will allow 
the Indonesian government to keep more accurate data of its diaspora 
41 At the time of writing, a special immigration-processing lane for “Diaspora” 
already existed at Jakarta’s main Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, although 
the author observed that the lane was unmanned and closed.
42 “Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 76/2017” [Presidential 
Regulation Number 76/2017] <http://sipuu.setkab.go.id/PUUdoc/175291/
Perpres%20Nomor%2076%20Tahun%202017.pdf> (accessed 24 August 2017).
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abroad, which would be beneficial for business and networking in the 
future. Minister Marsudi explained that, ultimately, the data will be used 
to better improve government services for the diaspora, which currently 
only consists of two full-time staff within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.43 Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Expert Staff for diaspora affairs 
Niniek Kun Nasyatie adds that the Diaspora Card will also be a useful 
form of identification and marker of diplomatic protection for Indonesia’s 
many domestic and foreign workers whose passports are often held by 
their foreign employers.44
There are obvious legal hurdles to be overcome here, and considering 
the recent increase in nationalist rhetoric surrounding land and business 
ownership in Indonesia, we can expect political pushback on the idea 
of land/business ownership by non-citizen members of the diaspora. 
Historically, Indonesia as a nation has also displayed deep distrust 
towards foreigners and fellow citizens who are perceived to have been 
disloyal in pledging allegiance to other nations. The image of foreigners 
(even those of Indonesian ancestry) as potential spies is still prevalent. 
The idea of now-foreign nationals or non-resident Indonesians receiving 
special privileges through the Diaspora Card does not sit well with more 
conservative Indonesian politicians and public. Furthermore, in the eyes 
of Jokowi’s political opponents, the Diaspora Card can be used as yet 
another example of the president’s lax — even welcoming — attitude 
towards foreign interests.
The Diaspora Card has also been devised with seemingly little 
consultation with governments of other countries, particularly Singapore, 
Australia, the Netherlands and the US where many Indonesians 
have become citizens over the years. It is unclear how these foreign 
43 “Penjelasan Menlu Retno Soal Kartu Diaspora Indonesia: Untuk Pendataan” 
[Foreign Minister Retno’s Explanation About Indonesian Diaspora Card: To 
Obtain Data] <http://news.detik.com/berita/3288192/penjelasan-menlu-retno-
soal-kartu-diaspora-indonesia-untuk-pendataan> (accessed 3 August 2017).
44 “Apakah Obama Boleh Menerima Kartu Diaspora Indonesia?” [Can Obama 
Receive the Indonesian Diaspora Card?] <http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/
indonesia-41016886> (accessed 24 August 2017).
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governments feel about its citizens receiving special identification cards 
that allow them to maintain interests and loyalties in Indonesia. To put it 
in a different perspective, many politicians and members of the public in 
Indonesia would almost certainly be outraged if countries such as China 
or India were to give special cards to Indonesians of Chinese or Indian 
descent that would allow them to maintain loyalties to their ancestral 
“homelands”.
More ambitiously, the IDN is currently lobbying for the term 
“diaspora” to be acknowledged and defined in Indonesia’s Constitution. 
Dr Djalal explained that such constitutional recognition is needed to 
lend legitimation to the diaspora’s requests for rights.45 At present, the 
Constitution defines “Indonesian citizens” as those who are either born 
in Indonesia or born of an Indonesian citizen parent. The IDN would like 
the Constitution to also acknowledge those who are “ethnically” (etnis) 
Indonesian but who are not citizens or who do not live in Indonesia. 
Dr Djalal argued that such recognition would create a greater sense of 
patriotism and belonging among Indonesians abroad.
However, such constitutional recognition would be both difficult 
and problematic. From a definitional point of view, “Indonesian” is not 
technically an ethnicity, since — like all other national identities — it 
was a modern national construct designed to unify the many ethnicities 
and local modes of belonging that have existed in the archipelago since 
before the country’s independence in 1945. Furthermore, since the scope 
of who may be regarded as a member of the Indonesian diaspora itself is 
currently very broad, it would be highly contentious to give constitutional 
recognition to those who only have very distant ties to Indonesia.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Indonesian government under President Jokowi has clearly been 
increasing its efforts to take advantage of the economic, political, and 
social potentials of the 8 million overseas Indonesians. Some initiatives 
45 Interview conducted in Jakarta on 4 July 2017.
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such as the Diaspora Card have been introduced to enable greater physical, 
financial, and emotional connections between Indonesians abroad 
and Indonesia as the “homeland”. However, there are some important 
legislative, administrative, and jurisdiction hurdles to overcome before 
the full planned benefits of the Diaspora Card enjoyed, particularly for 
non-citizen members of the diaspora. Other items of current debates, 
such as changing the dual citizenship law, diaspora parliamentary 
representation, and constitutional recognition, are even more difficult 
to negotiate, and the dual citizenship issue is unlikely to be debated in 
parliament until after the 2024 legislative election.
There are now plans to provide better services for members of the 
diaspora through the establishment of a separate diaspora affairs office 
that would have a similar function to China’s Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (OCAO, 
also known as qiaoban). It is not yet clear exactly what services would 
be provided by this new diaspora affairs office. For instance, considering 
that a large proportion of Indonesians abroad are domestic and migrant 
workers, it is not clear whether or not an office for diaspora affairs 
would also look after their affairs, or whether domestic and migrant 
workers would continue to be under the administration of the National 
Body for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
(BNP2TKI).
Furthermore, a critical lens needs to be applied to whether current 
diaspora initiatives also benefit more vulnerable members of the 
diaspora such as domestic workers who are often abused by employers 
and systemically disadvantaged by their lack of legal and diplomatic 
protection. Initiatives such as the Diaspora Card designed to enable 
members of the diaspora to invest in Indonesia are clearly geared towards 
middle-upper class overseas Indonesians who can afford to consider 
a transnational investment portfolio. Currently, middle-upper class 
members also vastly dominate diaspora lobby groups such as the IDN 
while there seems to be very little involvement by domestic workers. 
Indeed, at IDN congresses, speakers from migrant worker communities 
are usually represented at only one or two sessions.
If Jokowi’s administration wants to harness the diaspora’s potential, 
then it must also demonstrate that it is willing to put in the effort to 
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improve consular and other services, particularly for its most vulnerable 
members. At the moment, the Diaspora Card is little more than a feel-
good exercise designed to appease overseas Indonesians who had been 
lobbying for special privileges for a long time. However, for the card to 
be useful and meaningful, the government needs to coordinate between 
its various ministries and institutions in order to clarify exactly how 
proposed privileges for overseas Indonesians (both for those who are 
citizens and non-citizens) are to be implemented. Likewise, regarding 
the issue of dual citizenship, the government should at least draw up and 
communicate a realistic timeline of when and how the dual citizenship 
discussion is to progress. These concrete steps would demonstrate the 
government’s seriousness in reaching out to the Indonesian diaspora.
Ultimately, debates surrounding the diaspora are related to the 
changing definition of who can be regarded as “Indonesian” in this age 
of transnational connectivity. As discussed in this article, current public 
discourses on national identity and belonging still largely discriminate 
against those perceived to have a low sense of national loyalty through 
having sought a better life abroad. However, trends suggest that more 
and more Indonesians will go abroad to study, work, and live, either 
temporarily or permanently. New conceptualizations of national identity 
need to also take into consideration Indonesians abroad, many of 
whom still feel a deep attachment to the country. Moreover, as national 
boundaries become more porous and dual nationality comes to be 
adopted by more and more countries around the world, the Indonesian 
government needs to seriously consider persistent requests for the 
citizenship law to be reviewed.
If the Indonesian government succeeds in maintaining a strong 
sense of national belonging among the country’s transnationally mobile 
population, then Indonesians abroad would theoretically be more likely 
to act in the country’s interest. This is true not just for Indonesia, but 
also for other Southeast Asian countries with increasingly large diaspora 
populations. Thailand, for instance, currently has around 850,000 
Thais abroad (1.24 per cent of the country’s population), Vietnam 
has 2.5 million overseas Vietnamese (2.67 per cent of the country’s 
population), there are 1.8 million overseas Malaysians (5.7 per cent of the 
country’s population), and overseas Singaporeans are estimated to be at 
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46 “International Organization for Migration Data on Global Migration Flows” 
<https://www.iom.int/world-migration> (accessed 27 August 2017).
around 212,000 people (3.7 per cent of the population).46 Most Southeast 
Asian countries have put mechanisms in place to encourage emotional 
and commercial connections between diaspora communities and their 
homelands, although at present, only the Philippines allows its citizens 
to hold dual citizenships. However, especially now that Southeast Asian 
governments are keen to receive more foreign investments, there needs 
to be a more serious drive to tap into the wealth and networking potential 
of Southeast Asian communities abroad.
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